ベンタムによる、 国際法と戦争と平和についての議論。 1786-9年ごろに書かれたとされるが、 1843年にバウリング版に収録されるまで日の目を見なかった。
バウリング版第2巻に収録されている。 新全集版にはまだ収録されていない。
16/May/2001
以下は重要な箇所の抜き書き。小見出しはこだまが勝手に付けたもの。 長い段落は適当に切ってあります。
Essay I. OBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Should a Sovereign of a Nation Aim for the Greatest Happiness of his Citizens or that of All Nations?
If a citizen of the world had to prepare an universal international code, what would he propese to himself as his object? It would be the common and equal utility of all nations: [...]
But ought the sovereign of a state to sacrifice the interests of his subjects for the advantage of foreigners? [...]
It is the end which determines the means. Here the end changes [...] it is therefore necessary that the means should change or appear to change also.
The end of the conduct which a sovereign ought to observe relative to his own subjects, -- the end of the internal laws of a society, --- ought to be the greatest happiness of the society concerned. This is the end which individuals will unite in approving, if they approve of any. [...]
The end of the conduct he ought to observe towards other men, what ought it to be, judging by the same principle? Shall it again be said, the greatest happiness of his own subjects? Upon this footing, the welfare, the demands of other men, will be as nothing in his eyes: with regard to them, he will have no other object than that of subjecting them to his wishes by all manner of means. He will serve them as he actually serves the beasts, which are used by him as they use the herbs on which they browse ...
Yet in proceeding in this career, he cannot fail always to experience a certain resistance -- resistance similar in its nature and in its cause, if not always in its certainty and efficacy, to that which individuals ought from the first to experience in a more restricted career; so that, from reiterated experience, states ought either to have set themselves to seek out -- or at least would have found, their line of least resistance, as individuals of that same society have already found theirs; and this will be the line which represents the greatest and common utility of all nations taken together.
Hence, in order to regulate his proceedings with regard to other nations, a given sovereign has no other means more adapted to attain his own particular end, than the setting before his eyes the general end -- the most extended welfare of all the nations on the earth. (pp. 537-8)
Objects of International Law
[Here Bentham put forward five objects of international law: a given nation's duty of doing no harm to other nations; its duty of benevolence to them; its right not to be harmed from them; its right to receive benefits from them; and the duty of giving the least harm to other nations in case of war
1. The first object of international law for a given nation: -- Utility general, in so far as it consists in doing no injury to the other nations respectively, saving the regard which is proper to its own well-being.
2. Second object: -- Utility general, in so far as it consists in doing the greatest good possible to other nations, saving the regard which is proper to its own well-being.
3. Third object: -- Utility general, in so far as it consists in the given nation not receiving any injury from other nations respectively, saving the regard due to the well-being of these same nations.
4. Fourth object: -- Utility general, in so far as it consists in such state receiving the greatest possible benefit from all other nations, saving the regard due to the well-being of these nations.
5. Fifth object: -- In case of war, make such arrangements, that the least possible evil may be produced, consistent with the acquisition of the good which is sought for. (p. 538)
Prevention of War
Means of Prevention.
1. Homologation of unwritten laws which are considered as established by custom.
2. New conventions -- new international laws to be made upon all points which remain unascertained; that is to say, upon the greater number of points in which the interests of two states are capable of collision.
3. Perfecting the style of the laws of all kinds, whether internal or international. How many wars have there been, which have had for their principal, or even their only cause, no more noble origin than the negligence or inability of a lawyer or a geometrician! (p. 540)
Essay II. OF SUBJECTS, OR OF THE PERSONAL EXTENT OF THE DOMINION OF THE LAWS.
Essay III. OF WAR, CONSIDERED IN RESPECT OF ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES.
War and Crimes
War is mischief upon the largest scale. It might seem at first sight, that to inquire into the causes of war would be the same thing as to inquire into the causes of criminality, and that in the one case as in the other, the source of it is to be looked for in the nature of man, -- in the self-regarding, the dissocial, and now and then, in some measure, in the social affections. A nearer view, however, will show in several points considerable difference, -- these differences turn on the magnitude of the scale. (p. 544)
States Have No Persons
States have no persons distinct from the persons of individuals; but they have property, which is the property of the state, and not of individuals. (p. 544)
[cf. IPML Ch. 1: `The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members.']
ESSAY IV. A PLAN FOR AN UNIVERSAL AND PERPETUAL PEACE.
Two Ends to Be Pursued: Reduction of the Arms; Emancipation of Colonies
The following plan has for its basis two fundamental propositions: -- 1. The reduction and fixation of the force of the several nations that compose the European system; 2. The emancipation of the distant dependencies of each state.
International Morality Still in its Infancy
The moral feelings of men in matters of national morality are still so far short of perfection, that in the scale of estimation, justice has not yet gained the ascendency over force. [...]
[M]en have not yet learned to tune their feelings in unison with the voice of morality in these points. They feel more pride in being accounted strong, than resentment at being called unjust: or rather, the imputation of injustice appears flattering rather than otherwise, when coupled with the consideration of its cause. (p. 552)
Proposal of the Establishment of a Common Court of Judicature
That the maintenance of such a pacification might be considerably facilitated, by the establishment of a common court of judicature, for the decision of differences between the several nations, although such court were not to be armed with any coercive powers.