主要なのは3, 8, 14 http://www.justice4diane.org.uk/case.asp
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/1957438.stm
Diane Pretty's unsuccessful application to the
European Court of Human Rights claimed that the UK government were violating five
key rights. The judgement, delivered on Monday, rejected all of these
arguments.
Article 2 (right to life) - no violation.
Diane Pretty claimed that the existence of a
right to life could also confer a right to die - which she was therefore being denied.
The court ruled: "In its case-law in this
area the Court had placed consistent emphasis on the obligation of the State to protect life.
"In these circumstances it was not persuaded
that 'the right to life' guaranteed in Article 2 could be interpreted as involving a negative
aspect.
"Article 2 could not, without a distortion
of language, be interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right, namely a right to
die; nor could it create a right to self-determination in the sense of
conferring on an individual the entitlement to choose death rather than life."
Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment) - no violation
Mrs Pretty said that denying her the right to
assisted suicide was, by prolonging her life, making her endure such "inhuman or
degrading treatment".
The judges ruled: "The Court could not but
be sympathetic to the applicant's apprehension that without the possibility of ending her life
she faced the prospect of a distressing death.
"Nonetheless, the positive obligation on the
part of the State which had been invoked would require that the State sanction actions
intended to terminate life, an obligation that could not be derived from
Article 3." Article 8 (right to respect for private life) - no violation
Mrs Pretty claimed that this article clearly gave
her a right to self-determination, in particular the ability to choose how to end it.
The ruling stated: "The law in issue in this
case, section 2 of the Suicide Act, was designed to safeguard life by protecting the weak
and vulnerable and especially those who were not in a condition to take
informed decisions against acts intended to end life or to assist in ending life.
"The Court did not consider that the blanket
nature of the ban on assisted suicide was disproportionate.
"It did not appear to be arbitrary for the
law to reflect the importance of the right to life, by prohibiting assisted
suicide while providing for a system of enforcement and adjudication which allowed
due regard to be given in each particular case to the public interest in
bringing a prosecution, as well as to the fair and proper requirements of
retribution and deterrence."
Article 9 (freedom of conscience) - no
violation
Mrs Pretty said that the failure to provide a
scheme to allow her to end her life violated this act by preventing her from exercising her
beliefs.
The ruling stated: "The applicant's claims
did not involve a form of manifestation of a religion or belief, through worship, teaching,
practice or observance as described in the second sentence of the first
paragraph.
"The term "practice" did not cover
each act which was motivated or influenced by a religion or belief."
Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) -
no violation.
Mrs Pretty said that the current law discrimated
against her, as an able-bodied person would be legally able to commit suicide,
whereas she could not without help.
The ruling stated: "There was, in the
Court's view, objective and reasonable justification for not distinguishing in
law between
those who were and those who were not physically capable of committing
suicide.
"Cogent reasons existed for not seeking to
distinguish between those who were able and those who were unable to commit suicide
unaided.
"The borderline between the two categories
would often be a very fine one and to seek to build into the law an exemption for those
judged to be incapable of committing suicide would seriously undermine the
protection of life which the 1961 Act was intended to safeguard and greatly increase the risk
of abuse."